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*Abstract
This article critiques neoliberal transition theory from a state-centered per-
spective. Neoliberal scholars have used cross-national regression analysis to
argue that postcommunist economic failure is the result of inadequate
adherence to neoliberal precepts. Sociologists, in turn, have relied on case
study data to show that postcommunist economic failure is the outcome of
too close adherence to neoliberal policy recommendations, which has led to
an erosion of state effectiveness, and thus produced underdevelopment.
The present paper advances a version of this statist theory based on a
quantitative analysis of mass privatization programs in the postcommunist
world. We argue that the neoliberal policy of rapid large-scale privatization
creates severe supply and demand shocks for enterprises, thereby inducing
firm failure. The resulting erosion of tax revenues leads to a fiscal crisis for
the state, and severely weakens its capacity and bureaucratic character.
This, in turn, reacts back on the enterprise sector, as the state can no
longer support the institutions necessary for the effective functioning of a
capitalist economy, thus resulting in de-modernization. In this paper, we
test the predictions of neoliberal transition theory against those of our sta-
tist theory, using cross-national regression techniques. We find that the
implementation of mass privatization programs negatively impacts meas-
ures of economic growth, state capacity and the security of property rights.
2Introduction
Between 1989 and 1991, the Soviet empire disintegrated, leading to the
emergence of markets and private property in all socialist economies except
North Korea and Cuba. Western-trained neoliberal economists provided the
postcommunist policy elites with a blueprint for constructing capitalism
amid the ruins of communism.
1 These economists developed the so-called
Shock Therapy policy package, which was adopted in some form by most
of the postcommunist world (UNDP 1999: 30; Murrell 1996: 31;
Greskovits 1998: 22-23). In the still-communist countries of Asia, markets
and private property were being implemented more gradually, from 1978
onwards in China, and by the middle to late 1980s elsewhere in the region.
After another decade and a half of liberalization and privatization, few ana-
lysts predict anything but a capitalist endpoint. 
Despite the widespread implementation of the neoliberal policy agenda,
economic divergence in the postcommunist world has been greater than
anyone predicted. One of the most unexpected outcomes was what econ-
omists have termed the “postcommunist recession,” an economic decline
which amounted to a system-wide depression, leading to extensive de-
industrialization. The affected countries experienced a catastrophic decline
in the technological level of production, the effectiveness of state institu-
tions, levels of human capital and life expectancy (see UNDP 1999;
Vorobyov and Zhukov 2000; Burawoy 2001a). In Russia, as in most of the
Former Soviet Union (FSU) and South Eastern Europe (SEE), the poverty
rate skyrocketed, increasing from 2 percent in the late 1980s to 50 percent
by the middle of the 1990s (Milanovic 1998). Between 1989 and 1999,
Russian per capita income fell by 38 percent, while male life expectancy
declined by 5 years (World Bank 2004), ranking the country’s overall life
expectancy 122nd in the world, tied with North Korea and Guyana (Brainerd
and Cutler 2005: 2).
Central Eastern Europe (CEE) fared noticeably better. The region experi-
enced a substantial but relatively lower increase in poverty, while life
expectancy actually grew during the first decade of transition. In terms of
economic development, Poland (followed closely by Slovenia) grew the
most over this period, 39.3 percent, while Hungary, Slovakia, and the
Czech Republic returned to approximately at pre-transition levels. CEE also
stands out with respect to the quality of the state and the protection of
property rights, with the CEE states performing markedly better than the
rest of Eastern Europe and the FSU (EBRD 1999).
3
1 See anthropologist Janine Wedel’s (2002) seminal account of this network of economists and
postcommunist elites, and Kennedy’s (2002) influential description of “transition culture.”East Asia, where a number of communist regimes remained in power, expe-
rienced very high average growth rates, ranging from a moderate 36 per-
cent in Laos to an extraordinarily successful 119.7 percent in China. 
Table 1 demonstrates the overall diversity of postcommunist 
Table 1: Mass privatization programs, economic growth, state capacity, and security of
property rights
4
A comparison of countries within each region reveals substantial variation
that appears to follow no obvious pattern. The Czech Republic, for
instance, one of CEE’s most advantaged countries in terms of human cap-
ital levels, prior history of capitalism, debt burden, and location was the
worst performer on indicators of growth, state capacity, and security of















Albania  No  26.33 (1993-2003)  –  -29.0 
Armenia  Yes  10.14  1.72  -23.2 
Azerbaijan   No  -7.17 (1992-2003)  1.53  – 
Belarus  No  7.16  1.57  -31.1 
Bulgaria  No  -1.49  1.38  -19.2 
Cambodia   No  44.53 (1993-2003)  –  – 
China  No  198.92  –  – 
Croatia   No  5.29  1.43  -5.5 
Czech Republic  Yes  11.24  1.59  -22.2 
Estonia  No  10.45  1.95  -8.3 
Georgia  Yes  -54.45  1.24  -20.3 
Hungary  No  18.44  1.98  -12.9 
Kazakhstan  Yes  3.03  1.27  -30.6 
Kyrgyz Republic  Yes  -33.38  0.85  -38.7 
Laos   No  59.26  –  – 
Latvia   Yes  -9.89  –  -24.8 
Lithuania   Yes  -6.14 (1994-2003)  1.54  -29.4 
Macedonia  No  -9.01  --  -22.8 
Moldova  Yes  -49.56  0.82  -33.1 
Mongolia   Yes  -10.51  –  – 
Poland   No  59.89  1.69  -10.1 
Romania   Yes  -3.47  1.07  -21.6 
Russia  Yes  -20.66  1.16  -41.6 
Slovakia  No  11.79  1.65  -13.7 
Slovenia   No  46.52 (1993-2003)  1.95  -11.4 
Tajikistan   No  -49.22  –  – 
Turkmenistan   No  -5.14  –  – 
Ukraine  Yes  -45.26  1.24  -44.1 
Uzbekistan  No  -11.43  1.83  -9.5 
Vietnam   No  113.25  –  – 
Sources: World Bank (2004) and EBRD (1999).the European part of the FSU, few analysts would have predicted Belarus
to outperform Russia or Ukraine on these same indicators. Likewise, in
Central Asia, it is unclear as to how Uzbekistan was able to fare better than
the relatively modernized, oil-rich, and initially democratic Kazakhstan.
These cases are but three examples of a large variety of unexplained post-
communist outcomes. We argue that a substantial part of this divergence
in outcomes can be accounted for on the basis of particular government
policies employed during the transition. The differential implementation of
these policies in the 30 post-Soviet style economies
2 constitutes a quasi-
natural experiment in the transition to capitalism that provides a rare oppor-
tunity for social scientists to investigate some of the causal processes of
globalization and development.
Until now, sociologists have not offered many explanations of the post-
communist divergence, which is surprising, given sociology’s great atten-
tion to changes in culture (e.g., Eyal 2000; Eyal et al. 1998, 2001; Kennedy
2002), stratification order (e.g., Gerber and Hout 2004; Nee 1989; Walder
1995a; Oi and Walder 1999; Róna-Tas 1994; Burawoy et al. 2000), circu-
lation and reproduction of elites (e.g., Eyal et al. 1998, 2001) and structure
of property in the post-Soviet style economies (e.g., Stark 1996; Stark and
Bruszt 1998, 2001; Hanley et al. 2002; Walder 1995b; Oi 1992; Nee
1996; Borawoy and Krotov 1992; Burawoy 2001a, 2001b; King 2002;
King and Sznajder 2006). One possible explanation for this silence is that
many sociologists have relied on ethnographic, survey, or network data col-
lected in one or, at most, two countries, which for the most part preclud-
ed strong theorizing about postcommunist economic divergence due to a
lack of comparable data.
Nonetheless, some robust results have emerged from this case study liter-
ature. Perhaps the most consistent findings pertain to the role of the state
in causing postcommunist divergence: scholars have routinely observed the
beneficial effect of the state in China (Walder 1985; Nee 2000; Burawoy
1996), and documented the destructive effect of a state weakened by
neoliberalism in Russia (Burawoy and Krotov 1992; Burawoy 1996;
Burawoy 2001a, 2001b; King 2002, 2003). 
These findings stand in sharp contrast to the past decade and a half of
research by neoclassical economists, who have offered an explanation of
postcommunist divergence that confirms their original theory, utilizing
cross-national regressions of annual statistical data reported by the interna-
tional financial institutions. These authors hold that while countries did not
5
2 We have no data on the former Yugoslavia, and we exclude East Germany because it was formally
incorporated into one of the leading capitalist economies.start with identical initial conditions, and thus some had advantages over
others, most of the variation in postcommunist performance is explained by
how adequately neoliberal policy precepts were implemented. Specifically,
the claim is that the closer a given country adhered to the neoliberal policy
agenda, the better was its performance during the transition era.
The neoliberal position stands in direct opposition to state-centered expla-
nations, which, so far, remain unsupported by cross-national statistical
analyses, even though such methods are otherwise highly prevalent in soci-
ological research. The present paper corrects for this dearth by providing a
straightforward statistical evaluation of the neoliberal neoclassical econom-
ic and state-centered theories.
Our own theory holds that the implementation of neoliberal policies (meas-
ured by implementing Mass Privatization programs), creates severe supply
and demand shocks for the enterprise sector, leading to technological
downgrading and reliance on inefficient exchange relationships, such as
barter, to maintain production. These conditions create a fiscal crisis of the
state, which, in turn, erodes its bureaucratic capacity and strength. The
ensuing weak, non-bureaucratic state further damages prospects of suc-
cessful enterprise restructuring, especially in high-tech manufacturing. The
result is a vicious cycle of declining state capacity and enterprise failure,
resulting in system-wide de-modernization. 
The remainder of this paper is structured into six parts. The first specifies
in greater detail the neoliberal neoclassical economic transition theory. The
second elaborates the state-centered alternative. The third discusses the
methodology and data used in the existing econometric analyses of post-
communist performance. The fourth delineates our own variables, data,
methods, and hypotheses. The fifth reports the results of our regression
models, showing that the implementation of mass privatization programs
has led to de-modernization, as measured by reduced state capacity, inad-
equate protection of property rights and lower economic growth. In the
conclusion we delineate a number of theoretical and policy implications, and
suggest directions for future research. 
The Neoliberal Theory of Economic Transition
Neoliberal Shock Therapy was, above all else, a Smithian analysis: a suc-
cessful transition to capitalism could be accomplished by relying on the
power of market forces and private property, unleashed by a radical cur-
tailment of the state’s involvement in the economy. Shock Therapy, it was
argued, would set free economic restructuring in the postcommunist world,
leading to rapid growth and convergence with the West (Sachs 1994: 25).
6The heart of the theory is the Smithian notion that economic development
can be achieved by combining free markets with private property. The 1999
edition of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s (EBRD)
Transition Report succinctly sums up the consensus of foreign advisors and
postcommunist policy elites at the start of the transition: “Private owner-
ship would ensure profit-oriented corporate governance, while liberalization
of trade and prices would set free the competitive market forces that
reward profitable activities. Firms would have therefore both internal and
external incentives to restructure” (1999: 167). For the analysts at the
EBRD, of course, it went without saying that this scenario takes low infla-
tion as a given, as stable money provides the foundation for the type of
rational decision-making which is believed to be the primary mechanism of
developmentally beneficial restructuring. Within this framework, self-inter-
ested actors (i.e., private owners), responding to the “true” information of
prices, pursue rational economic activity and, when aggregated at the
national level, this will produce the most efficient outcome. The role of the
state is limited to the protection of property rights and the provision of pub-
lic goods. Internationally, each country comes to rely on doing what it does
best, taking advantage of its real (i.e., non-socialist) comparative advan-
tage. The policy implications are clear. After macroeconomic stabilization
measures are introduced, the priority should be on liberalizing (both exter-
nally and domestically) and privatizing the economy as quickly as possible. 
The logic is elegant. Neoliberal reforms (rapid liberalization, privatization,
and stabilization) would combine the advantage of “true prices” with “a
fully private incentive structure,” unleashing enterprise restructuring (EBRD
1999: 167; see also Sachs 1992, 1996; Frydman, Gray, and Rapaczynski
1996; Kosolowski 1992; Lipton and Sachs 1990a; Fischer and Gelb 1991;
Blanchard et al. 1993: 10-11; Carlin, Reenen, and Wolfe 1994: 72). At the
same time, mass privatization would destroy the strongest potential anti-
reform coalition. Neoliberals expected that unless firms were privatized and
trade in their sectors liberalized during the brief window of opportunity
afforded by the period of “extraordinary politics,” managers and workers of
state-owned enterprises could be expected to act in their own self-interest
and seek to halt or even roll back privatization and liberalization efforts in
order to put off the unpopular consequences of restructuring (e.g., lay-offs)
(Lipton and Sachs 1990b: 298; see also Frydman, Rapaczynski, and
Turkowitz 1997: 84; Blanchard et al. 1991: xiv).
Privatization, by creating a system of dispersed economic owners in eco-
nomic competition with each other, is thought to create agents with an
interest in a lawful and rational state that provides an even playing field.
These new capitalists would have a powerful interest in forging a “night-
7watchman state” (EBRD 1999).
3 Such a state, because it refrains from dis-
torting markets, would create conditions for the optimal reallocation of cap-
ital and the continued restructuring of the enterprise sector. Since failing
companies would no longer be rescued through government intervention,
state investment would be replaced by private capital, as free competition
would generate a complete set of markets. This includes a capital market
(Lipton and Sachs 1990a: 102, 111), which would fund enterprise restruc-
turing. Taken together, these conditions would create the optimal incentive
structure for firms to restructure so as to reflect their real comparative
advantage, thus laying the foundation for rapid economic growth and con-
vergence with Western Europe (Sachs 1994: 25; Blanchard et al. 1991;
EBRD 1999).
Neoliberals believe the political success of this policy package depends
above all on speed.  Privatization had to be accomplished during the period
of “exceptional politics,” when people were willing to put aside short-term
self-interest for the future benefit of society. It was understood that eco-
nomic actors are rational utility-maximizers, and that self-interested behav-
ior was bound to reassert itself sooner rather than later. Therefore, as there
was no way of knowing how long this window of opportunity would last,
governments had no choice but to pursue rapid large-scale privatization.
Economists and policy-makers have long known how to stabilize and liber-
alize economies (i.e., by raising interest rates, limiting monetary emissions,
freeing prices, and opening up trade. In the postcommunist context, this
could be accomplished through national parliamentary legislation. In con-
trast, the difficulties in privatizing a large number of state-owned enterpris-
es in a short period of time were enormous. Margaret Thatcher only man-
aged to privatize about 30 companies over the course of eleven years. The
postcommunist world, however, had thousands of large state enterprises
and, unlike England, no existing class of capitalist owners. Furthermore,
neoliberal policy advisors by and large assumed that transition economies
were too risky for foreigners to make large investments, and that, even if
foreign direct investments were forthcoming, local nationalist forces would
prevent large amounts of privatization to foreigners (Frydman, Pistor and
Rapaczynski 1996). Considering the potentially short-lived window of
“exceptional politics,” foreign investment was simply too slow to be viable
strategy (Blanchard et al. 1991).
The solution was to implement mass privatization programs, which involved
the rapid transfer of shares to firm insiders and citizens for nominal sums, thus
8
3 This is a reformulation of arguments made by Therborn (1978), Friedman (1962) and Hayek
(1944).creating a kind of “people’s capitalism.” However, it was assumed that com-
petition, a free capital market, and unhindered firm exit and entry would quick-
ly lead to a concentration of capital. Some neoliberals argued that Western
financial consulting firms should serve as asset management companies, in
which ordinary people could invest their vouchers. Voucher or citizen privati-
zation would thus legitimize the transition to capitalism by giving citizens and
firm insiders a stake in privatization, while at the same time providing an
ingenious vehicle for the transformation of large amounts of state property
during a short period of time. Appendix B describes the different ways priva-
tization occurred. Mass Privatization was by far the most innovative.  
The State-Centered Alternative
We build our theory on the basis of findings from qualitative sociological
research. Burawoy and Krotov (1992) provide one of the first and most
important sociological critiques of neoliberal transition economics, relying
on extensive ethnographic fieldwork in a number of firms of a Russian lum-
ber conglomerate. They describe a situation where neoliberal policies have
ironically led to the realization of the classic communist dream of the “with-
ering away” of the state. Rather than producing a modern capitalist market
economy, the reforms produced a system of “merchant capitalism,” an
account which Burawoy later reformulated as a theory of postcommunist
“involution” that results from state failure (1996, 2001a).
According to the theory of merchant capitalism, Shock Therapy led to the
destruction of the socialist planning apparatus. However, rather than mar-
kets emerging to take its place, the pathologies of the old economic system
were exacerbated. The informal relationships that had emerged between
enterprises as they were trying to solve the problems of the socialist short-
age economy were recreated by postcommunist managers who, faced with
the dismantling of the planning apparatus, resorted to barter instead of
monetized, market relationships. Old socialist conglomerates, freed from
central control, and still possessing monopoly power in their markets, acted
to reinforce their positions of supremacy. The resulting disruption in supply
chains led to greater anarchy of production. This anarchy of production
could only be solved by improvisation by workers. This  created even
greater worker control of the labor process than existed under socialism,
and thus gave rise to a situation in which the workers became essentially
merged with the means of production. As a result of these conditions, there
were no systematic incentives or pressures for firms to reinvest in the
means of production or to change products to maximize profits (as there
are in Western capitalism). Instead, surplus was appropriated in the sphere
of circulation by “merchant capitalists,” a politically connected trade and
financial elite, who then shipped their new wealth out of the country.
9Burawoy (1996, 1999, 2001a, 2001b) develops this merchant capitalism
thesis into a theory of postcommunist involution. His comparison of Russia
and China, although based only on Russian fieldwork, highlights the cen-
trality of the state in explaining postcommunist divergence. Juxtaposing the
two countries, Burawoy argues that “[a]t each step of the transition the
absence of an effective state explains the unintended consequences of
reform as the acceleration of economic involution” (1996: 1111).
Even though involution was driven by state collapse, Burawoy insists that
involution is not a feature of the transitional system, but rather an “emer-
gent and enduring type [with] nothing inherently unstable about [it]” (1996:
1115). Thus, ironically, it is the weakened state itself which locks in per-
manent involution by continuing to bail out inefficient firms, thus recreating
soft budget constraints. As a result, firms do not go out of business, and
resources are not re-allocated to more efficient purposes. “Russia … ended
up with a perverse combination of private property and soft budget con-
straints. The result is involution” (1996: 12). 
We agree with much of Burawoy’s analysis. Neoliberal policies successful-
ly destroyed the planning apparatus but, unfortunately, did not confirm the
neoliberal belief that “markets spring up as soon as central planning bureau-
crats vacate the field” (Sachs 1994: xii). Eliminating state involvement in
the economy does not automatically produce Smithian behavior (specializa-
tion, innovation, accumulation, and rational profit-maximization). Rather,
postcommunist actors were able to recreate socialist informal institutions to
shield firms from exposure to the competitive market forces, as described
by Burawoy and Krotov.
We also build off of Burawoy’s concern for an effective state (see also
Manchin and Szelenyi 1987 and Szelenyi and Kostello 1996). This, of
course, echoes a theme in sociological analyses of China (Walder 1995b;
Nee 2000), comparative and historical sociology, and the sociology of
development more generally (Evans 1995; Evans and Rauch 1999; Chibber
2002). We must, however, slightly modify the mechanisms outlined in
Burawoy’s theory. His analysis, ultimately, rests on the observation that in
Russia, as opposed to China, there was no “communist party to fall back
on” for maintaining political control, thus forcing the state to resort to firm
bailouts to ensure domestic stability (1996: 115). We believe this argument
both over-emphasizes the hardness of budget constraints in the Chinese
state-owned sector and under-emphasizes the hardness of these con-
straints in Russia. Even if Burawoy is empirically correct, however, isolating
the existence of the communist party as a key variable offers no vantage
point for explaining differences between Russia and other East European
countries, in which the communist parties had also disintegrated. 
10Our analysis differs from Burawoy’s insofar as it places primacy not on the
state’s ability to produce hard budget constraints, but on the depressive
effects of Shock Therapy on firms and, subsequently, state capacity via the
mechanisms of falling revenues and increased incentives for corruption.
Fieldwork in Russian firms reveals a myriad of supply and demand shocks
that hit firms following the implementation of neoliberal reforms (King
2002, 2003). By 1999, most Russian firms operated under substantially
hardened budget constraints. While the state bailed out some major firms
at points during the first half of the 1990’s, the shortage of state revenue
made these rescue operations, for the most part, a phenomenon of the
past. Yet the central problem facing the economy was not the end of gov-
ernment bailouts, but a lack of state support for market institutions. Firms
stayed alive, despite hardened budget constraints, largely by relying on non-
market forms of exchange. They attempted to meet market demand to the
extent possible, but this typically meant moving (far) down the technologi-
cal ladder due to the disruption of complex high-tech supply networks.
Thus, we offer an alternative state-centered theory, building on Burawoy’s
analysis of postcommunist involution, which emphasizes supply and
demand shocks to enterprises, as well as their indirect effect on state
capacity as the main mechanism responsible for de-modernization. 
The negative shocks to the domestic economy which follow rapid liberal-
ization of prices and foreign trade, as well as the shock associated with the
austerity of stabilization programs, have been extensively discussed by het-
erodox critics of the Washington Consensus (the most prominent is Nobel
Laureate Joseph Stiglitz [2002]; but see also Gowan 1995, 1999; Andor
and Summers 1998; Chossudovsky 1997; Amsden, Kochanowicz, and
Taylor 1994; UNDP 1999). These depressive affects (on the supply of
investment capital from austerity and the loss of markets to global players
from liberalization) are by now well known and understood.  
The third component of Shock Therapy, the one empirically examined in
this paper, is the implementation of mass privatization programs. These pro-
grams have received vastly less attention than the other “shocks” (but see
Ellerman 2001, McDermott 2002; King 2001, 2002, 2003 for exceptions).
Mass privatization allowed large state-owned firms to be quickly privatized
even though no class of domestic capitalists existed. In effect, this was a
reverse “telescoping” of class formation, using state fiat to speed up what
has always been a relatively lengthy historical process. 
As a result of this creation of private owners by fiat, firms privatized though
such programs did not have owners with sufficient resources to restructure
them. Cut off from state resources, but without any capital to carry out
11desperately needed restructuring, and without the injection of new mana-
gerial talent, many firms found themselves in untenable positions. Owners,
managers, and workers, unable to work cooperatively to better their com-
mon cause, pursued short-term, self-serving strategies to accumulate
wealth and survive the transition. 
Mass privatization also created minority owners with no capacity to moni-
tor firm insiders or other owners. This outcome was inevitable because the
institutions that protect shareholder rights and help to create markets in
advanced capitalist systems – regulators and regulatory agencies, an inde-
pendent business press, credit rating agencies — did not yet exist (Hall and
Soskice 2001; Elson 1991). This combination led to large amounts of asset
stripping, wreaking havoc on the functioning of many firms..
Sometimes, privatization leads to a total change of product line, creating an
additional supply shock for downstream industries. As an example the one
factory making cathode ray tubes for Soviet television producers was pri-
vatized, and turned into a beer factory. This eliminated the one source of
an affordable input that accounts for 60-70% of the value added in the final
product. The equivalent imported products were too expensive to make pro-
duction profitable (King 2003). 
As a result of the multiple supply and demand shocks produced by Mass
Privatization (as well as other neoliberal reforms), most firms experienced
severe financial crises. Firms responded in a number of ways: a large share
of all wages went unpaid; firms reduced their demand for inputs, especial-
ly investment goods; and there was a huge decline in gross capital forma-
tion throughout Eastern Europe and the FSU.
4 In addition to lowering pro-
duction and investment, firms retreated to non-monetary (and thus non-
market) mechanisms of exchange to ensure survival (e.g. barter), and/or
shifted to lower value-added production to earn actual currency (EBRD
1999).
As economic activity declined and crisis hit the enterprise sector, tax pay-
ments shrank due to the spread of hard-to-tax barter, and the decrease in
value-added resulting from technological downgrading. Importantly, Mass
Privatization eliminated the institutional basis for extracting resources from
society (taxation) before another, income or profit based tax system, was
established. In the communist period, the state funded itself with the prof-
its from the profitable state owned enterprises. Privatization eliminated this
revenue stream before the taxation system was well established. These
12
4 For example, by the end of Russia’s mass privatization program in 1994, investment had declined
to 30 percent of its level in 1990. By 2000, it was at only 18 percent of its level in 1990.effects combined to create a severe fiscal crisis.
5 In Russia, for example,
receipts of the consolidated state budget declined from 41 percent of GDP
in 1990 to only 26.8 percent in 1997, even as real GDP was halved
(Vorobyov and Zhukov 2000: 5; EBRD 1999: 73). As a result, both state
orders and state payments for the remaining orders collapsed, producing
another major demand shock for firms.
The loss of tax revenue from enterprise failure, exacerbated by the rise of
difficult-to-tax non-monetary transactions, inevitably weakened the state.
This fiscal crisis, combined with a widespread hostility toward industrial and
Keynsian policies, resulted in a lack of support for the institutions that
enable firms to restructure in order to compete in high value-added goods
on the liberalized domestic or world market. A particularly important
instance of this phenomenon occurs when the state stops supporting the
institutions that turn out skilled manpower – especially young experts – and
enable R & D efforts. Many firms in Russia suffered from the inability to
replace skilled manpower because the state drastically reduced funding for
the local polytechnics that trained people for these occupations (King
2003). 
This fiscal crisis also meant that the state was increasingly unable to meet
its formal obligations to its officers. The state began to break down since
poorly paid (or unpaid) state officials were easily corrupted. Its bureaucrat-
ic nature decomposed as it became riddled by patron-client ties between
government officials and businessmen, which then created additional barri-
ers to the operation of firms without such connections (for Russia, see the
seminal works of Pappe 2000, and Reddaway and Glinski 2001). Private
market success came to depend to a great extent on arbitrary political deci-
sions and the exercise of private force. This lawless environment also react-
ed back on the enterprise sector, curtailing entrepreneurship and invest-
ment.
All these effects combined to create postcommunist de-modernization or
involution. 
The competing causal effects of mass privatization are represented in fig-
ure 1. 
13
5 Unfortunately, we do not have data on state revenues for most countries in the early nineteen-
nineties, so we are unable to test these points directly in the analysis.14
Figure 1: The Consequences of Mass Privatization  
The Neoclassical Neoliberal Framework
Although we believe that research into the affects of other policies should
be a high priority, we have reason to believe that privatization policy will be
the single biggest determinant of postcommunist variation. There simply
was not enough variation in the existing measures of liberalization and sta-
bilization to explain much of the dependent variable. 
The Econometric Literature on Postcommunist performance
There is a substantial econometric literature using cross-national data that
supports the neoliberal position. This literature has three major strands. The
first, the orthodox position, holds that the central determinant of postcom-
munist economic success is the implementation of neoliberal policies, which
consist of various types of deregulation, stabilization, and privatization
measures – collectively referred to as “liberalization” (de Melo and Gelb
1996; de Melo et al. 2001; Sachs 1996; Fischer, Sahay and Vegh 1996).
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Privatization A second group, the economic institutionalists, argues that economic
reforms have basically no effect. What matters instead are history and
geography, reflected in a variety of structural features referred to as “initial
conditions” (Popov 2000; Stuart and Panayotopoulus 1999; Campos
2001). The orthodox position does not deny the importance of “initial con-
ditions” but it emphasizes the pathologies of accumulation under socialism,
most importantly “over-industrialization” and “lack of market experience.”
Accordingly, the postcommunist world is mostly paying the price of having
an “artificially” high growth of living standards in the past. Finally, a third
group argues for the joint importance of a wide variety of initial conditions
and the implementation of liberalizing reforms (Falcetti, Raiser and Sanfey
2002). 
The Liberalization Index
Within the economic literature, the specification of the independent vari-
able, the measurement of liberalization, comes from only a few sources.
Most accounts use an index created by Martha de Melo and her colleague
Alan Gelb (1996) of the World Bank.
6 This variable combines many policies
and also partially measures the success of these policies. The de Melo and
Gelb composite liberalization index (LI) has three weighted components: (1)
internal markets (liberalization of internal markets and the abolition of state
trading monopolies) (weight .3); (2) external markets (liberalization of the
foreign trade regime, elimination of export controls and taxes, and substi-
tution of low-to-moderate import duties for import quotas and high import
tariffs; current account convertibility) (weight .3); and (3) private sector
entry (including progress of small-scale and large-scale privatization)
(weight .4).
Added together, these components produce an index that ranges from 0 to
1 with 0 representing an unreformed economy and 1 an extensively
reformed economy. The component measures are partially based on annu-
al scores produced by the EBRD for its Transition Report series. De Melo
and Gelb describe their index creation as follows:
An extensive process of consultation was followed in assigning annual country
rankings for each component of the LI [liberalization index]. First, the authors
proposed rankings on the basis of their own knowledge and country reports.
Second, the authors consulted World Bank and other country specialists on a
country’s pace of reforms over time and on its ranking relative to other transi-
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6 De Melo was Head Economist of the Policy Research Department for the Transition Economies at
the World Bank, and part of the team of researchers that produced the analysis for the World
Development Report From Plan to Market (1996). Both de Melo and Gelb were also affiliated with
the Harvard Institute for International Development which was headed by Jeffrey Sachs at the time.tion countries known by the specialist. Third, revised rankings were submitted
to a second round of comments from relatively senior experts who have a com-
parative perspective across a wide ranger of countries. And fourth, for the 25
countries in the CEE and FSU, a further adjustment was made based on the
transition indicators in the EBRD’s 1994 Transition Report and the accompa-
nying text. This adjustment was designed to introduce further objectivity into 
the country rankings … In the final analysis, the rankings reflect the author’s
judgment [1996:36].
A close look at some of the country scores for privatization undermines
their validity. Take, for instance, the scores for privatization in Russia and
Poland. According to country reports published by the EBRD, Russia, from
1992 to 1994, privatized about 80 percent of its large enterprises via a
mass privatization program. In Poland, by contrast, resistance to mass pri-
vatization plans delayed the program until 1995, and limited its scope to
small and medium-sized firms worth only 10 percent of total state assets
(Orenstein 2001; Kramer 1995). Yet, in terms of its privatization score
(ranging from 0 to 1), de Melo and Gelb assigned Poland a .82 in 1992,
whereas Russia received a .49; by 1994, Poland was a deemed a .86, and
Russia only a .66. Thus, according to these indicators, one would get the
impression that the Poland was much closer adherence to neoliberal policy
precepts with regard to privatization than Russia, when in reality the reverse
was true: by 1994, Russia had privatized 15,000 large state-owned enter-
prises and Poland almost none. 
Overall, the LI covers a variety of different policies, some of which likely
produced opposite effects. Moreover, the index contains an inherent bias
toward success, as a number of its component indicators taken from the
EBRD reports include indirect measures of a growing economy or an effec-
tive state in their definition of the higher scores.  It also seems possible that
the coders have a strong theoretical orientation and value commitment
toward neoliberal economic orthodoxy, and sincerely believe the latter to
produce developmentally beneficial outcomes (see the seminal works by
Wedel [2001] and Kennedy [2002]). In the construction of subjective index-
es, such perceptions might inadvertently enter the coding process. Indeed,
at least the liberalization and privatization EBRD indicators suffer from coder
bias (King et al. 2008)
A further problem with the LI is that it does not take into account the “dou-
ble movement” identified by Polányi (1957). That is, the destabilizing effect
free-market policies exert on society, provoking a backlash that necessitates
a partial reversal of those policies. For instance, as David Woodruff (1999)
shows in Money Unmade, Russia’s strict monetarist policies led to the pro-
liferation of barter and the use of local monies. This, in turn, forced the gov-
ernment to print more rubles in an effort to renationalize the increasingly
fragmented economy, thus, in effect, reversing the monetarist policies.
16We argue that the best way to test for the effects of neoliberal (or any
other) policies is to use variables that represent in a clear and straightfor-
ward way the actual implementation of concrete policies. Lumping all poli-
cies into a single variable might obscure all kinds of potentially cross-cut-
ting effects which makes inferring causality about policies even more diffi-
cult than normal.
Annual Rates of Growth versus Absolute Rate of Growth 
When measuring economic growth, most of the econometric literature relies
on variables measuring annual rates of growth, such as annual change in
GDP or GDP per capita. Annual rates of growth might be highly misleading
as an indicator of transition success because the steeper the economic
decline of a given country during the early transition years the higher will
be its subsequent short-run (i.e., annual) growth rates, for the economy is
starting out at a lower base. Consequently, we argue that the rate of
growth over the entire period should be the variable of interest in statistical
analyses of the transition to capitalism.  None-the-less, we also use annual
rate of growth as a dependent variable. 
Data, Variables, and Hypotheses
Data
The analyses reported in this paper are based on a dataset of the social,
economic, and political development of 30 transition and reform communist
economies. This data is drawn from two principal sources: (1) the World
Bank World Development Indicators Database (World Bank 2004), an annu-
al compendium of economic, social, environmental, business, and technol-
ogy indicators for 152 countries with populations of more than 1 million
people; and (2) the World Bank/EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey (World Bank and EBRD 2000), a survey of over 4000
firms in 25 transition economies, conducted between 1999 and 2000, that
examines a wide range of interactions between firms and the state.
7 In addi-
tion, variables were generated on the basis of historical records, including
those provided by the various editions of the Transition Report (EBRD 1994-
2005).
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7 The survey is based on face-to-face interviews with firm managers and owners; it is designed to
generate comparative measurements in such areas as corruption, state capture, lobbying, and the
quality of the business environment, which can then be related to specific firm characteristics and
firm performance. The survey includes about 125 firms randomly sampled in each country, with larg-
er samples for Poland and Ukraine (over 200 firms), and an even larger sample for Russia (over 500).
While the survey excludes China and Vietnam, and consists exclusively of cross-sectional data, it
provides exceptional coverage of the postcommunist world, and is therefore most appropriate for the
purpose of the present paper.Response Variables
Economic growth. We use the percentage change in GDP per capita (PPP)
between 1989 and 2003 as a measure of economic growth. We also repli-
cate the analysis using the annual rate of growth. 
State Capacity. Constructing valid and reliable measure of the bureaucratic
nature of the state or of state capacity is notoriously difficult. The present
analysis relies on a governance quality index developed by the EBRD. The
index is a composite score ranging from 1 (ineffective) to 3 (highly effec-
tive), taken from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Survey, which averages a firm’s perception of obstruction resulting from
microeconomic and macroeconomic factors, physical infrastructure, and
law and order (EBRD 1999: 116). Given the subjectivity and presence of
bias in other EBRD indicators, it seems very likely that any bias will be cod-
ing more successful countries as having better governance, and will thus
make for a very conservative test of our hypothesis.  
Property Rights. Strong bureaucratic states protect property rights and con-
tracts. Drawing again from the Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey, we incorporate a variable that indicates the percentage
of a country’s firms which disagree or strongly disagree with the statement
that their national government “will uphold contracts and property rights.”
Central Explanatory Variable
Mass Privatization. A binary indicator is used to specify whether a given
country implemented a mass privatization program, defined as a program
that relied on either vouchers or vouchers combined with subsidized insid-
er buy-outs, that covered at least 25 percent of the assets of all large state-
owned enterprises over a period of two years.
8 This is a very rough meas-
ure that indicates that a substantial Mass Privatization program was imple-
mented. This coding is based on the country descriptions that accompany
each EBRD transition report. Although a rate variable would be much more
useful, it is not possible to construct such a variable from the EBRDs reports
because of inconsistency in reporting. The EBRD has no data archive, so
these published reports contain the entirety of their data on privatization.
The problem in constructing a rate variable is that the Transition Reports
provide data on total assets of firms, or total number of firms, or in percent
of total employment. All of these measures have advantages and disad-
vantages, but the fact is that we can not construct a better variable with
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8 The coding for each country is reported in Table 1. See appendix B for the best estimate of the
size of the programs. the records of the International Financial Institutions that kept track of these
events. So, the rough binary measure we created is what we use in our
analysis. The officer responsible for mass privatization at the World Bank
during this period, Ira Lieberman, agreed with our coding. What is crucial
from a scientific perspective is that our variable construction is completely
replicable. Anyone can get the individual country reports of the Transition
Reports, and check our coding. Appendix B provides more detailed infor-
mation on the programs taken from the pages of the Transition Reports.
Looking at appendix B, the 25% cut-off is a natural place to cut the sam-
ple. There are several countries with about 10% or less, while the rest of
the countries that had such programs included 30-80% of the firms or
assets or labor force. 
Control Variables
Initial development. We use initial GDP per capita (logged) prior to transition
as a measure of controlling for initial differences in wealth between coun-
tries, a measure which economists like Barro (1991) have found to be asso-
ciated with future growth rates. 
Total Population. Total population prior to transition is included as a meas-
ure of country size.
Presence of Oil. A binary indicator is employed to account for the presence
of large amounts of oil, as this may have a strong effect on a country’s eco-
nomic performance during the transition.
9
Military Conflict. A variable measuring the sum of years of conflicts or eth-
nic violence, which are typically associated with major economic disrup-
tions. 
Transition Progress. An aggregate transition indicator is employed to con-
trol for transition progress to date. In its original form, this indicator is the
average of eight component transition indicators of structural reforms pub-
lished in the EBRD Transition Report series, measuring the extent of enter-
prise privatization and restructuring (three indicators), market liberalization
and competition (three indicators), and financial sector reform (two indica-
tors). For the present purpose, the component indicators for privatization
progress were removed, making the aggregate indicator a measure of
19
9 Findings regarding the direction of this effect, however, are inconclusive. Assuming that the nec-
essary infrastructure was in place, the presence of oil should have made the transition easier, given
the value of oil as an export commodity. Some research (Gylfason 2001; Sachs and Warner 1995;
Sala-i-Martin 1997), however, found that resource-rich economies have, on average, grown slower
than those with poor resource endowments.progress in areas other than privatization.
10
Central Eastern Europe and Baltic States. A binary indicator is used to iden-
tify Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, as these countries
were, on average, significantly more successful than other transition
economies.
Hypotheses 
We investigate the following hypotheses which were derived from our
state-centered theory of transition:
Hypothesis 1: Countries that implemented mass privatization 
programs will have lower growth of GDP per capita over the 
transition period than countries that did not implement mass pri-
vatization programs.
Hypothesis 2: Countries that implemented mass privatization
programs will have lower state capacity than countries that did
not implement mass privatization programs. 
Hypothesis 3: Countries that implemented mass privatization 
programs will have worse enforcement of contracts and protec-
tion of property rights than countries that did not implement 
mass privatization programs.
For each of these hypotheses we could have contructed neoliberal versions
that are the mirror-image of the state-centered ones (Mass Privatization
leads to more growth, better state capacity and better protection of prop-
erty rights). 
Models were estimated using ordinary least-squares regression. In each
case, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test, as well as several graphical
tools, were used to test for heteroskedasticity. Models in which het-
eroskedasticity was detected were re-estimated using robust errors. In addi-
tion, all models were tested for outliers and influential cases; removing influ-
ential cases, at no point, led to different substantive conclusions. 
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10 In their original form, the EBRD indicators range from 1 to 4+, where 4+ indicates that a given
country’s structural characteristics are comparable to those found in an advanced capitalist econo-
my, and 1 corresponds to the conditions in an unreformed, centrally planned economy with state
ownership as the dominant form of ownership. In order to facilitate statistical analysis, the transition
indicators were linearized by assigning a value of +1/3 to a “+” sign, and a value of –1/3 to a “–”
sign. Note that the transition indicator is merely used to control for reform measures other than mass
privatization programs; it is not conceived as a way of assessing the viability or timing of those
reform measures and, in fact, it would be misleading to use it for this purpose since they are biased
in favor of growth, as argued above.Results
Table 2 reports the coefficients for the regressions of economic growth on
mass privatization and several additional explanatory variables. 
Table 2: Coefficients for regressions of GDP per capita growth (1989-2003) on mass
privatization and several control variables
15
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Model 1 considers the effect of mass privatization programs without any
control variables. The coefficient indicates that countries that implemented
a mass privatization program, on average, experienced 47.3 percent less
growth in GDP per capita (PPP) during the period from 1989 to 2003 than
countries that did not, a finding that is statistically significant. The model
explains about 21 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. Model
2 introduces a series of additional explanatory variables, including initial
GDP per capita, initial population, years of military conflict, and presence of
oil. The coefficient for mass privatization remains virtually unaffected in
light of these controls. In Model 3, we add transition progress to date as a
further control variable.
11 Adding this explanatory variable increases both
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
11 As noted above, the transition indicator has a built-in positive bias; its coefficient should there-
fore not be taken at face value as it most likely provides an overstated estimate of the benefits of
rapid economic openness.
15 The models contain a dummy variable indicating whether a given country is missing data in the
response variable for 1989; coefficients are not reported. We also ran the full model on a data set pro-
vided by the United Nations Commission for Europe that reported GDP per capita PPP from 1990 to
2003, excluding Bosnia and East Asia (not reported). There were no missing years of data for any coun-
tries. The results were statistically significant and consistent with those reported in Table 2 (-25%).
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
  All cases  All cases  All cases  All cases  w/o E Asia 
Mass privatization  -47.3459  -47.8938  -51.9633  -49.4195  -30.2719 
  (3.10)**  (3.48)**  (3.82)**  (3.76)**  (4.02)** 
Initial GDP per capita  -  -0.0019  -0.0048  -0.0061  0.0003 
    -0.89  -2.03  (2.23)*  -0.17 
Initial population (log)  -  17.6017  18.1827  18.1564  0.2981 
    (2.40)*  (2.58)*  (2.56)*  -0.08 
Presence of oil  -  -24.4604  -6.4573  -3.715  17.983 
    -1.75  -0.4  -0.23  -1.53 
Military conflict  -  -6.4099  -6.3087  -5.4329  -4.5838 
    -1.71  -1.93  -1.44  (2.28)* 
Transition progress  -  -  29.5008  22.0797  25.0359 
      -1.78  -1.21  (2.65)* 
CEEB  -  -  -  26.3103  - 
        -1.18   
Constant  32.3933  -233.1852  -298.876  -280.1306  -67.022 
  -1.72  -2.06  (2.40)*  (2.22)*  -1.05 
Observations  30  30  30  30  26 
R-squared  0.21  0.57  0.61  0.63  0.70 the negative magnitude and significance level of the mass privatization
coefficient, indicating that its effect holds even when other reforms (i.e.,
stabilization and liberalization measures) are accounted for. In Model 4, we
introduce a control variable for Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic
States. This lowers the coefficient for mass privatization only marginally,
suggesting that this regional difference does not explain the previously
observed results. Finally, in Model 5, we exclude the East Asian cases from
our model; while doing so leads to a somewhat lower coefficient for mass
privatization, the negative direction and significance of the effect remain
unchanged. Taken together, the results from Table 2 demonstrate that
mass privatization programs are associated with significantly lower eco-
nomic growth over the transition period.
Table 3 replicates the analysis using the annual rate of growth of GDP. Even
though this indicator is biased against hypothesis 1, the results show that
mass privatization programs are associated with substantially worse eco-
nomic performance. Mass Privatization alone predicts 2.5% less growth per
year, and can explain 19% of the variance. In the full model (16) the coef-
ficient is about 3% less growth per annum.   
Table 3: Coefficients for regressions of average GDP per capita growth (1989-2003) on
mass privatization and several control variables
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  Model 14  Model 15  Model 16  Model 17  
  All cases  All cases  All cases  w/o E. Asia 
Mass privatization  -2.5047  -2.6782  -2.9257  -1.7189 
  (2.85)**  (2.85)**  (3.15)**  (2.38)* 
Initial GDP per capita  0  -0.0001  -0.0002  0.0001 
  -0.14  -0.41  -1.3  -0.42 
Initial population (log)  -  0.6347  0.6701  -0.1827 
    -1.87  -2.02  -0.52 
Presence of oil  -  -1.3919  -0.2968  0.9428 
    -1.03  -0.2  -0.83 
Military conflict  -  -0.4906  -0.4844  -0.4512 
    -1.94  -1.97  (2.34)* 
Transition progress  -  -  1.7944  1.485 
      -1.5  -1.64 
Constant  1.4609  -7.9992  -11.9949  -1.1148 
  -0.89  -1.38  -1.93  -0.18 
Observations  30  30  30  26 
R-squared  0.19  0.43  0.49  0.56 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
16 The models contain a dummy variable indicating whether a given country is missing data in the
response variable for 1989; coefficients are not reported.23
Table 4 reports the results of the regressions of governance quality on mass
privatization programs and a series of additional explanatory variables. 
Table 4: Coefficients for regressions of quality of governance index on mass privatiza-
tion and several control variables
Variable  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 
Mass privatization  -0.446**  -0.365*  -0.374**  -0.361** 
  (0.118)  (0.131)  (0.137)  (0.118) 
Initial GDP per capita (log)  –  0.124  0.096  0.044 
    (0.087)  (0.110)  (0.119) 
Initial population (log)  –  -0.044  -0.034  -0.034 
    (0.066)  (0.072)  (0.055) 
Presence of oil  –  -0.025  -0.005  0.013 
    (0.193)  (0.204)  (0.113) 
Military conflict  –  -0.003  -0.002  0.013 
    0.040  (0.041)  (0.053) 
Transition progress  –  –  0.072  -0.047 
      (0.164)  (0.145) 
Central Eastern Europe and Baltics  –  –  –  0.285 
        (0.240) 
Constant  1.696***  1.411  1.282  1.895 
  (0.083)  (1.274)  (1.345)  (1.253) 
Adj. R
2  0.412  0.371  0.333  0.368 
N  20  20  20  20 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Model 6 indicates that mass privatization has a strong negative and signif-
icant effect on the indicator of state capacity, which amounts to more than
a full standard deviation of the dependent variable (its minimum is .82, its
maximum is 1.98, and its standard deviation is .344); the model explains a
full 41.2 percent of the variation in state capacity. The introduction of sev-
eral additional explanatory variables in Model 7 reduces the negative mag-
nitude of the privatization coefficient slightly but does not affect its signifi-
cance level. These findings hold when transition progress (Model 8) and
regional variation (Model 9) are taken into account, indicating that the
observed negative effect of mass privatization programs on government
effectiveness constitutes a robust finding. Countries that implemented a
mass privatization program were thus more likely to experience a significant
decline in government effectiveness.Table 5 presents the results for the regressions on property rights security.
Table 5: Coefficients for regressions of property rights security on mass privatization and
several control variables
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Variable  Model 10  Model 11  Model 12  Model 13 
Mass privatization  -14.094***  -11.955**  -13.191***  -13.180*** 
  (3.338)  (3.256)  (2.946)  (3.013) 
Initial GDP per capita (log)  –  3.961  0.495  0.100 
    (2.091)  (2.361)  (2.543) 
Initial population (log)  –  -0.648  0.389  0.398 
    (1.699)  (1.574)  (1.610) 
Presence of oil  –  -4.082  -1.510  -1.289 
    (5.332)  (4.868)  (5.000) 
Military conflict  –  1.997  2.206*  2.315* 
    (1.031)  (0.923)  (0.969) 
Transition progress  –  –  9.167*  8.118 
      (3.839)  (4.460) 
Central Eastern Europe and Baltics  –  –  –  2.446 
        (4.923) 
Constant  -15.869***  -38.158  -52.168  -47.423 
  (2.26)  (31.864)  (28.974)  (31.139) 
Adj. R
2  0.423  0.496  0.600  0.582 
N  24  24  24  24 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Noting that higher values of the response variable denote more secure prop-
erty rights, Model 10 shows that mass privatization programs have a neg-
ative and highly significant effect on the security of property rights; the
model accounts for approximately 42.3 percent of the variation in the
response variable. In countries that adopted mass privatization programs,
ceteris paribus, the percentage of firms reporting insecure property rights
and contract enforcement was about 14 percent higher than in countries
which did not implement such programs. Adding controls for initial devel-
opment, country size, oil, and years of military conflict (Model 11) produces
a slightly lower but nonetheless significant coefficient for mass privatiza-
tion; the explained variation increases to about 49.6 percent. Model 12
demonstrates that the observed relationship between mass privatization
and property rights security holds, even when one controls for otherreforms, which themselves appear to have a beneficial impact on property
rights security.
12
The model accounts for roughly 60 percent of the variation in the response
variable. Finally, Model 13 reveals that the previous findings hold, even when
the superior regional performance of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic
States is taken into account. Altogether, the results reported in Table 4 indi-
cate strong support for the hypothesis that mass privatization programs are
associated with reduced security of property rights and contracts.
Taken together, these findings constitute a strong confirmation of
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. Countries that implemented mass privatization pro-
grams experienced reduced economic growth, and are characterized by
lower state capacity and worse enforcement of property rights and con-
tracts than countries that did not implement such programs.
Let us now return briefly to the issue of growth rates. Figure 2 presents two
graphs on the economic performance of postcommunist countries. The first
graph represents the entire population of postcommunist countries, where-
as the second graph excludes the East Asian cases. (Note that Mongolia,
as a former satellite state of the FSU, was not removed). The graphs divide
countries into mass privatizers and non-mass privatizers. In each graph, two
locally weighted regression lines (lowess smoothing curves) are shown,




12 Note that the coefficient of the transition indicator is only marginally significant (p=0.044), and
that its significance disappears when the regional control variable is introduced in Model 13.
13 These graphs are for heuristic purposes, and are not meant to imply causality. To make such
claims, a proper time-series analysis would have to be performed, a task well beyond the space lim-
itations of this article.Figure 2: Mass Privatization and Underdevelopment
GDP per capita
GDP per capita (without East Asia)
The graphs show that while the transition depression affected all countries,
evident in the downward trajectory during the early years of transition, the
mass-privatizing economies recovered substantially later than non-mass pri-
vatizers. Crucially, the subsequent rate of growth is not higher among coun-
tries which implemented a mass privatization program. (In fact, they grew
26at a slightly slower pace.) Thus, the argument made by advocates of Shock
Therapy, that more radical reforms deliver higher long-term growth even if
they are initially painful, is not confirmed by these graphs.
Discussion and Conclusion
Our analysis strongly supports the state-centered theory of transition over
the neoliberal neoclassical version. We restricted our hypothesis-testing to
only one element of a tripartite neoliberal reform package, namely, mass pri-
vatization programs. The neoliberal theory holds that mass privatization pro-
grams improve the economic functioning of firms, secure the liberal char-
acter of the state, and neutralize political opposition in the transition to cap-
italism. Instead, as our findings demonstrate, the implementation of mass
privatization programs hurt the enterprise sector, and contributed to the
weakening of the bureaucratic character of the state and its ability to sup-
port the institutions necessary for a functioning capitalist economy. From
the neoliberal perspective, this produces what can be termed the paradox
of the liberal path to patrimonialism. “Telescoping” the formation of private
property had the exact opposite affect than was intended by the neoliber-
al. Rather than securing the transition to Western-style capitalism, it
derailed the entire transition. A different type of capitalism, emphasizing
patron-client ties and a non-bureaucratic state, has emerged. Meanwhile,
the countries that went much slower in creating a private sector, like Poland
and Slovenia, are much closer to the Western capitalist systems with a rel-
ative separation of politics and economics (King 2002, King and Szelenyi
2005).  
Because we have limited our analysis to mass privatization programs, we
have not provided evidence that the rest of the neoliberal paradigm has a
negative impact, even if rapid privatization is demonstrated to be an erro-
neous policy. From the beginning, privatizing the large number of state
enterprises in the postcommunist world was by far the most challenging
issue for neoliberal researchers and policy advisors. In fact, there was dis-
agreement even within the neoliberal community, as scholars such as Janos
Kornai (1990: 11) warned against super-rapid privatization, arguing that it
was far more important to get strategic owners that will be able to restruc-
ture enterprises.
While our findings indicate that mass privatization programs have a destruc-
tive effect on economy and state, we do not claim that the neoliberal end-
point is undesirable. What we demonstrate is that the neoliberal policy
package accomplishes the opposite of its stated purpose. Thus, the policy
implications of the present analysis are clear. Whenever designing liberaliz-
ing reforms of any sort, far more attention must be paid to safe-guarding
27state revenues so as to protect its bureaucratic stability. On a theoretical
level, our analysis supports the position that state and market are not antag-
onistic entities as maintained by the neoliberal perspective (Block 1994;
Evans 1995; Fligstein 2001; Block and Evans 2005). It also supports the
traditional sociological thesis of the importance of a bureaucratic state for
successful capitalist development (e.g., Weber 1978; Evans 1995; Evans
and Rauch 1999; Chibber 2002). 
Finally, the findings also falsify the political economy analysis of neoliberal
transition scholars: delaying large-scale privatization did not lead to a rever-
sal of the transition process. The incorrect predictions of this mode of the-
orizing, which constituted the justification for the Shock Therapy policy
package and radical economic reforms in general, reveal the inadequacies
of the political analysis of many neoclassical economists. Given that the
neoclassical model is based on the assumption of utility-maximizing indi-
viduals, it is indeed inexplicable why the actors in the state-owned sector
of postcommunist countries that did not rapidly privatize did not form the
expected anti-reform coalitions, or otherwise attempted to obstruct the
implementation of reforms.
While we do not offer any such political analysis in the present paper, we
firmly believe that sociology, not neoclassical economics, seems to provide
the correct theoretical tools for developing a realistic political economy
analysis of postcommunism, and developing countries more generally. Such
an analysis seeks to explain transition policies, to a large extent, as the
result of structural forces. However, as Weber emphasized, structures
merely load the historical dice for different outcomes, which are often the
result of some strategic decision or historical accident. Weber thought of
such strategic choices as the switching points on the train tracks of histo-
ry. We believe that mass privatization was the biggest such switching point
in the postcommunist context.
14
28
14 Stuckler et al (2008) have shown in a probit analysis that Mass Privatization programs were best
predicted by the demonstration effect of big neighbors and as a result of ethnic competition. The
size of the second biggest ethnicity was a significant predictor. This captures newly minted nation-
al elites using Mass Privatization to unseat ethnic Russian managers, thereby allowing the appoint-
ment of new clients. This is consistent with detailed historical work on Russia that has shown that
privatization was politically, rather than economically, determined, and that, furthermore, there was
a great degree of contingency. To Russian historians and social scientists, there is no question that
the decision to undertake mass privatization was by no mean pre-determined. There was, in fact,
substantial conflict over this issue, and its resolution could well have turned out otherwise.
Ultimately, this resolution occurred with the bombing of the Russian parliament by Yeltsin, and the
agreement between Luzhkov and Chubais that mass privatization would be implemented in Russia
as a whole, excluding Moscow (see the ample documentation of this point in Reddaway and Glinski
[2001] and Medvedev [2000]). It is worth noting that Moscow, which avoided mass privatization,
has vastly outperformed Saint Petersburg and the rest of Russia on both economic growth and gov-
ernment effectiveness.It should by now be clear that almost all other ways of dealing with the
problem – that is, privatizing the state-owned sector – would have been
preferable to the neoliberal-inspired mass privatization programs. As an easy
alternative, maintaining state ownership until some restructuring was done
and/or a viable strategic owner appeared, seems like a much better policy.
This is essentially the difference in Poland and Russia’s privatization expe-
rience, producing strikingly different results. 
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Appendix B: Types of privatization 
There were eight different ways in which this privatization was actually
accomplished. All countries employed a mix of these methods.  
(1) Vouchers or coupons. These were programs that distributed
“vouchers” or “coupons” to the adult citizenry which can then
be used to purchase enterprises during privatization auctions. 
Their face value was much greater than their cost to the public.
This was the major method in Russia and the subject of this 
empirical analysis.
(2) Competitive auctions. This typically occurred after a period of
active restructuring. Some form of foreign ownership was often
a natural outcome of this method (since they would be expect-
ed to win a large percentage of fair auctions because of their
capital and experience). This was the modal form employed in 
Hungary and Poland (see King and Snajder 2006). 
(3) Non-competitive auctions. In many instances politically connected
businessmen are able to privatize enterprises via rigged auctions.
In such cases, the price paid for the enterprise is incredibly low.
This was the modal form of Russia’s raw materials sector in the
now infamous “Loans for Shares” program in which the crown-
jewels of the Russian economy, its oil and metals firms, were
privatized by oligarchs in exchange for media and political sup-
port for Boris Yeltsin’s 1996 re-election bid (see King and 
Treskow 2006 for details).
(4) MEBOs. Perhaps the most common form of privatization overall
was management and employee buyouts. There were a variety
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of ways of accomplishing this transfer, but it almost always
involved substantial discounts to enterprise insiders. In most
cases, management or some outside owners would centralize
the shares of the workers by slowly buying them up. Sometimes
there would use lease-to-own arrangements, where managers 
and employees would lease the enterprise from the state until
they paid an amount that made them its owners. 
(5) ESOPs. These are employee shared ownership schemes in
which the employees gain ownership of the firm. Unlike ordinary 
management and employee buyouts however, there is a legal 
devise that centralizes the ownership and voting of the workers.
This is crucial, since it guarantees actual worker control. These 
were very rare throughout the postcommunist world, and were
mostly prohibited in practice in Russia. 
(6) FDI. Foreign direct investment is typically the outcome of fair
auctions, but can also be accomplished in other ways. There can
be a formal or informal preference for FDI (such as in Estonia, 
where FDI was sought as a hedge against Russian domination). 
There can be FDI via closed tender, where the process isn’t
transparent but negotiated between the government and foreign
buyer behind closed doors. FDI is the dominant method in
Hungary, Estonia, and CEE more generally. FDI can also take the 
form of joint ventures with state owned enterprises (this is very
common now in China). 
(7) Cross-ownership. Here, firms are allowed to purchase the shares 
of other firms, which in turn purchase the shares of their new
owners. The result is a system of cross-institutional ownership
where a group of firms own themselves. This in practice means
the upper management of these firms controls them from out-
side owners. This was observed in the Czech Republic (King
2001).
(8) Restitution. In some cases the legal title of some enterprises that
had been nationalized by the Communist regime was returned to
their original family of ownership. Another variant was to give
vouchers to compensate for nationalized property that could be
used to purchase other stocks.  This was a very minor method
overall.  
(9) Greenfield privatization. This is the strategy of not privatizing
SOEs for quite a while, but creating conditions conducive to 
greenfield investment and the exit of inefficient firms. In
essence, this allows a private sector to grow up around a state
owned sector, until the country “outgrows the plan.” This is the 
dominant method in China. Appendix C:  Best Estimate of Extent of Mass Privatization Program
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Country  Mass privatization scheme 
Albania   Never implemented 
Armenia  75% medium and large enterprises  
Azerbaijan  Less than 10% of firms by assets  
Belarus  Never implemented 
Bulgaria  Never implemented  
Cambodia   Never implemented 
China  Never implemented 
Croatia  Very small program (225,000 people) in residual state holdings 
in 15% of enterprises 
Czech Republic  33% of assets of all firms 
Estonia  Never implemented 
Georgia  50% of medium and large enterprises 
Hungary  Never implemented 
Kazakhstan  60% of large enterprises  
Kyrgyz Rep  50% of medium and large enterprises  
Laos   Never Implemented  
Latvia  About 40% of large or medium enterprises  
Lithuania  About 45% of all enterprise assets 
Macedonia  Never implemented  
Moldova  40-50% of assets 
Mongolia  About 75% medium and large enterprises  
Poland  About 10% of assets 
Romania  About 38% of medium and large enterprises 
Russia  More than 80% of the industrial workforce 
Slovakia  About 10-15% (all while part of Czechoslovakia)  
Slovenia  Never implemented 
Tajikistan  Never implemented 
Ukraine  About 44% of medium and large enterprises  
Uzbekistan  Never implemented 
Mass Privatization = Privatization by vouchers alone on in combination with Management and
Employee Buyouts (see Appendix B for description). 
Source: Country descriptions, all years of Transition Report (EBRD 1994-2005); Livingstone
1997: 233-4 for Cambodia.  Korsun and Murrell 1995: 476  for Mongolia; Livingstone 1997:
229 and Government of the Lao PDR 1994: 17 for Laos.References.
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